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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 09/07/2011

Accident number: 730

Accident time: 08:54

Accident Date: 17/08/2010

Where it occurred: AF/3203/00398, MF
081, Dragi Village,
Tani District, Khost
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 10/10/2010

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
CBDT
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: steep slope
Date last modified: 09/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
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being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-23 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
Demining investigation teams were convened by AMAC Gardez and [Demining group] to
investigate and find out the cause of the demining accident involving [the Victim] the deminer
of [Demining group] CBDT-23. The accident occurred at 8:54 hours, on 17 August 2010 in
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 located in Dragi village, Tani district of Khost province.
SUMMARY:
Task # AF/3203/00398/MF 081 is located in a mountainous area contaminated with antipersonnel mines, in Dec 2009 the area polygon surveyed by [Demining group] LIAT–11.
Mines planted by Russian forces during the year 1984 to protect their position from the
possible attacks of mujahiddin.
Mine clearance operations in Tani district started by [Demining group] as community based
demining approach and deminers from the community are engaged in this operation. On 8th
July 2010, CBDT-23 started demining operations in mentioned minefield; the progress was
around 20% till the demining accident happened. The team found/destroyed 4 anti-personal
mines up to the accident time.
On 17 August 2010 Mr. [the Victim] the deminer was working in his clearance lane excavating
a detected signal, his excavation tool touched a mine and caused it to explode. According to
the investigation report the signal was not pinpointed correctly and the de-miner has used his
bayonet directly on the top of anti-personnel mine, so the accident happened. Unfortunately
the victim deminer was not fully dressed with PPE, so he got severe injuries on his eyes,
whole face and finger of his left hand.
As the majority of minefields in Tani district are located on the hillsides, and the likelihood of
mines with changed position due to seasonal flood is high. Therefore, a comprehensive site
operations plan was required covering all the predictable scenarios during the clearance
operations e.g. changes in direction of mines, mine displacement etc. But this point was
missed in the site operations plan.
CONCLUSIONS:
The main contributing factor to this demining accident was the carelessness of deminer
himself. In addition, as the deminer was working without having worn his PPE appropriately
and had not been controlled by the command group, therefore, the weakness of command
and control is also noticeable.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
[Demining group] operation department is recommended to take necessary action in terms of
strengthening command and control element in their teams especially in community based
projects.
•

A strong discipline should be emplaced in all community based projects as this is the
third accident within Tani CBD project of the same scenario.
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•

As Tani is a tribal area and all the people are strongly following their elders, therefore,
the issue of carelessness of deminers should be discussed with elders and the
possible consequences of the situation should be detailed to them.

•

[Demining group] operations department is recommended to develop a plan for the
improvement of supervision, command and control in their teams.

Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this
letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 923

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Eyes; severe Face; severe Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his eyes, whole face
and finger of his left hand".

Analysis
The type of AP blast mine is inferred from other accidents nearby: it is likely to have been a
PMN or a PMN-2.
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators identified field control failings and the Victim was working improperly (visor
raised or not worn) but his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a
Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators advised the managers to develop
a plan for improved “supervision, command and control”.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible
than the internationals with overall responsibility.
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